Simone de beauvoir and jean paul sartre: Regarding their conceptions of freedom and the relations these conceptions may have to ethical theory by Galic, Dusan
Simone de Beauvoir and Jean Paul Sartre: 
Regarding their conceptions of freedom and the 
relations these conceptions may have to ethical 
theory 
Dusan Galic 
University of Kansas 
William Shakespeare once wrote "To be or not to be, that is 
the question." Jean Paul Sartre would more than likely have dis-
missed this question in its entirety. According to Sartre in Being 
and Nothingness, each human being as an individual conscious-
ness is at the same time what it is and what it is not. "What being 
will be must of necessity arise on the basis of what it is not, [i.e. 
nothingness]," writes Sartre.1 This activity of nothingness that we 
as consciousnesses assume lies at the heart of Sartre's analysis of 
human freedom. He argues that we are trapped within an ambigu-
ous situation in which we are torn between our factical existence 
as a being in itself and the free and undefined existence as a being 
for itself. It is this latter existence that we exercise this notting 
activity, freely and spontaneously choosing "not" to be determined 
by the world and its inhabitants and creating meaning and inter-
preting the world as we as individuals see fit. 
This ontological notion of freedom is most famously shared 
by Sartre's lifelong companion, Simone de Beauvoir. Beauvoir 
admits that Sartre's analysis serves as the foundation for all free-
dom. However, in The Ethics of Ambiguity she revises his analy-
sis by distinguishing between the aforementioned freedom that is 
a universal fact of human existence (freedom as consciousness) 
and the freedom that is a moral choice (moral awareness). This 
further enrichment of the notion of freedom as offered by Beau-
voir is prompted by her recognition that there are people, such as 
women and laborers, who find themselves in an oppressive state 
in which they are prohibited from exercising this fundamental 
freedom and must result to various forms of political action such 
as revolt to overcome this oppression. This revision of Sartre's 
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philosophy has led Beauvoir to criticize Sartre's analysis of free-
dom as being somewhat abstract and underdeveloped. In the fol-
lowing essay I will flush out Beauvoir's criticism through her 
discussion of oppression, moral freedom, and the importance of 
"others" and provide a plausible response on Sartre's behalf with 
the help of both of his later and earlier philosophical works. 
Through the viewpoints of these various Sartrean pieces I will 
attempt to illustrate that while they might initially seem to offer a 
reasonable reply, they ultimately fail to fully refute Beauvoir's 
particular criticism. 
Before we can begin to expound on Beauvoir's notion of a 
moral freedom, we must first understand her reasons for its intro-
duction. In The Ethics of Ambiguity Beauvoir clearly writes that 
there is an ethics only "if there is a problem to solve. The ethics 
which have given solutions by effacing the fact of the separation 
of men are not valid precisely because there is this separation. An 
ethics of ambiguity will be one which will refuse to deny a priori 
that separate existants can, at the same time, be bound to each 
other, that their individual freedoms can forge laws valid for all." 2 
It is well known that Beauvoir's development of an ethics (of 
ambiguity) was written against the backdrop of Sartre's text Being 
and Nothingness. And while Beauvoir concedes that each individ-
ual's freedom as consciousness in which one is a being for itself is 
fundamental and essential for an individual, the question that re-
mains is why one should adopt this ontological notion of freedom 
if we, are as Sartre claims, condemned to be free. That is to say, 
Sartre might have successfully provided a descriptive account of 
our natural human freedom but has failed to provide a prescriptive 
ethical theory demonstrating why we ought to choose freedom. 
Beauvoir's ethics is then an attempt to offer reason(s) behind this 
choice and her answer is none other than the problem of oppres-
sion or injustice. To further clarify this reason she critically eval-
uates Sartre's analysis of consciousness. According to Sartre, ev-
ery human being as a for itself (consciousness) is equally free and 
thus a slave's consciousness is just as free as his master's and 
even if the possibilities of action are minimal or nill the slave can 
still freely interpret internally his situation. And the only thing 
that could potentially and briefly limit our freedom is the facticity 
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in which we find ourselves. However, Beauvoir argues that al-
though Sartre recognizes that facticity and situation limit an indi-
vidual's freedom in the sense that one's freedom is always contex-
tual, he does not allow that there are differences amongst our situ-
ations that create inequality with regards to an individual's capac-
ity to exercise her freedom. Beauvoir stresses that we are embod-
ied creatures deeply shaped by and embedded in society and its 
institutions, living in a community of intersubjectivity with other 
humans. And all of these things modify our individual capacity 
for recognizing and exercising our freedom as active, moral choice 
makers. Therefore, according to our different social situations and 
unequal status, people are unequally free, i.e. there are oppressors 
and those that are oppressed. However, if we were to simply ac-
cept Sartre's ontological notion of freedom as the only type of 
freedom, then it would make no sense to speak of oppressor and 
oppressed, for according to Sartre even in a state of oppression 
one has the internal freedom of thought to reinterpret her situation 
and make it her own. This denial of concrete reality in which op-
pression /injustice run rampant in today's society is why Beauvoir 
criticizes Sartre's analysis as an abstract and disembodied free-
dom that results in an attitude of inaction towards alleviating the 
ills of mankind. And the oppression that Beauvoir alludes to not 
only refers to one type experienced by one group, rather she speaks 
of physical oppression felt by slaves, economic oppression felt by 
laborers and an oppression of sexism felt by women. The oppressed 
are simply "those beings whose life slips by in an infantile world 
because, having been kept in a state of servitude and ignorance, 
they have no means of breaking the ceiling which is stretched over 
their heads." 3 
This reality of oppression then sets the stage for her discus-
sion of a twofold moral freedom: recognition and the adoption of 
my own freedom and the freedom of others. In other words, in 
order to reach the Utopian society in which all have achieved this 
moral freedom, one must first become aware of the injustices in 
one's own situation and then those in the situations of others be-
fore any action to overcome and revolt against this oppression can 
occur. She writes, "In order for men to become indignant or to 
admire, they must be conscious of their own freedom and the free-
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dorn of others. Thus, everything occurs within each man and in 
the collective tactics as if men were free."4 
How then do we achieve this moral freedom on first a per-
sonal level? Beauvoir stresses that one must first realize one's 
ontological freedom for that is the original condition of all justi-
fication of existence through which she is able to create meaning 
and value. However, it is only through the reflective, decisional 
manifestation of this original freedom that moral freedom is 
achieved. In other words, one must will to positively adopt one's 
natural freedom and through this choice one will in effect obtain 
moral freedom. "To will oneself free is to effect the transition 
from nature to morality by establishing a genuine [moral] free-
dom on the original upsurge of our existence." 5 According to 
Beauvoir, this achievement of moral freedom necessitates the call 
for action, i.e. action that will serve to end the oppression that 
one as an individual experiences and the oppression that many 
others have to endure and suffer through. Therefore, this moral 
freedom is one that can be described as an ethics of action and 
also one that is clearly lacking from Sartre's philosophy. Beau-
voir claims that "it is contradictory to set freedom up as some-
thing conquered if at first [as Sartre claims] it is something giv-
en." 6 What then makes this moral freedom a necessity in the real 
world and how does it serve as a criticism to the analysis of free-
dom as spelled out by Sartre? Beauvoir argues that if we merely 
ended with our given, natural freedom there would never be any 
need to act out against the injustices and oppression that many 
people experience. Beauvoir, when speaking of Sartre, comments 
that "if a door refuses to open, [he would respond by saying] lets 
us accept not opening it and there we are free. But by doing that, 
one manages only to save an abstract notion of freedom. It is 
emptied of all content and all truth." 7 Therefore, Beauvoir's no-
tion of a moral freedom is one that not only forces one to become 
aware of herself as a free, conscious being but to actively and 
positively choose to live by this original freedom. In this sense 
"to will oneself moral and to will oneself free are one and the 
same decision." 8 This moral freedom for Beauvoir is described as 
a process of self-surpassing or transcendence. As we strive to-
wards an authentic existence as morally free beings she claims 
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that as consciousnesses we go beyond what we are and what we 
have been in our past and we can do so only by owning our reality 
and accepting fully responsibility for it. Unfortunately, we often 
evade this choice and the responsibility that accompanies it. She 
recognizes that failure is part of any ethical theory; however, in 
spite of our inevitable mishaps we must seek a genuine develop-
ment of our will thus empowering us to free ourselves from op-
pression. "A freedom can not will itself without willing itself as 
an indefinite movement. It must absolutely reject the constraints 
which arrest its drive toward itself. Thus, just as life is identified 
with the will-to-live, freedom always appears as a movement of 
liberation." 9 According to Beauvoir, the way in which we fail with 
respect to this movement and allow ourselves to fall into a state 
of oppression is eerily similar to the way in which an adult falls 
back into her nostalgic and worry-free past as a child. For exam-
ple, a woman may choose to accept and live by the values that 
society has deemed as being feminine such as those of humility 
and coquettishness. However, Beauvoir stresses that the differ-
ence is that "the child's situation is imposed upon him, whereas 
the woman chooses it or at least consents to it." 1 0 Thus, as a result 
of this woman's consent and upon the awareness of her childlike 
values and oppressive situation, she is without excuse and is obliged 
to resist these unjust limitations on her freedom for the sake of 
preserving her own freedom. 
Yet, this woman is not alone in her struggle and movement 
towards liberation for there are many people that share her pain 
and exist in similar oppressive situations. Thus according to Beau-
voir, to truly live as an authentic and morally free agent one must 
also become aware of and adopt the enlargement of the freedom 
of all individuals as one's universal moral ideal and engage one-
self in actions concretely directed to that end. This requires the 
full recognition that human reality is social and not just merely 
individual. She writes, "Every man has to do with other men. The 
world in which he engages himself is a human world in which 
each object is penetrated with human meanings. He must disclose 
the world with the purpose of further disclosure and by the same 
movement try to free men, by means of whom the world takes on 
meaning."" 
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This endeavor to preserve the freedom of others then serves 
as Beauvoir's third and final part of her criticism of Sartre's anal-
ysis. That's to say, while Beauvoir stresses the importance of com-
munal activity and being with others, Sartre finds the world of 
others as problematic and inherently ridden with conflict. In one 
of his plays entitled No Exit he goes so far as to claim that "hell is 
other people." On the other hand and despite her emphasis on so-
cial reform, Beauvoir reminds us that her own ethical analysis of 
freedom is not one that denies in some a priori sense the separate 
existences of concrete individual human beings. Thus the focus is 
still on the individual, but this does not imply that these individu-
als cannot be bound together in communities where they can exer-
cise their freedom in joint projects to liberate their fellow man 
from oppression and forge universal laws that would ensure their 
liberation. In fact, it is only through our interactions and relations 
with others that we are able to fully become morally free beings. 
"One can reveal the world only on a basis revealed by other men. 
No project can be defined except by its interference with other 
projects. To make being 'be ' is to communicate with others by 
means of [authentically] being. Only the freedom of others keeps 
each one of us from hardening in the absurdity of facticity."1 2 This 
collective struggle to solve the problem of oppression then takes 
the form of a revolution. According to Beauvoir, each one of us 
must actively commit ourselves to revolt against the oppressive 
situation and the men that have placed many of us there robbing 
our lives of all meaning and accomplishment. She writes, "The 
oppressed has only one solution: to deny the harmony of that man-
kind from which an attempt is made to exclude him, to prove that 
he is a man and that he is free by revolting against the tyrants." 1 3 
However, our revolutionary activities and the violence that we 
might employ are to some extent limited. Beauvoir states that "vi-
olence is justified only if it opens concrete possibilities to the free-
dom which I [as an oppressed person] am trying to save." 1 4 In fact 
she would exclude such things as the killing or torturing of our 
oppressors. She writes, "In order for a liberating action to be a 
thoroughly moral action, it would have to be achieved through a 
conversion of the oppressors [as well]. Only then can there be a 
reconciliation of all freedoms."15 She concludes by arguing that 
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she cannot provide any recipe on how exactly we are to conduct 
this revolution. She actually thinks that no ethics of action can do 
so, for the path towards moral freedom is left up to each responsi-
ble individual and the collective to which she belongs. 
What then can we make of Beauvoir's criticism of Sartre? 
Many supporters of Sartre claim that the primary later work in 
which he attempts to address this criticism is The Critique of Dia-
lectical Reason: Volume One. After his first hand experience with 
the horrors of WWII and his interest with the Marxist plea to end 
the ongoing alienation of laborers, he felt that the reality of op-
pression and injustice must be made aware of and furthermore 
overcome. However, he knew that his ontological analysis of an 
intuited personal freedom would be insufficient in properly ad-
dressing these present ills of mankind. Therefore, he sought to 
provide a sociological explanation for them by "situating" our free-
dom. The method that we are to employ in order to bring our situ-
ation to light is what he refers to as the Progressive-Regressive 
method. "It is progressive because it seeks part of the explanation 
in the aims and actions of conscious beings and it is regressive 
because it looks at the historical and social conditions in which 
each conscious being pursues his objectives." 1 6 Sartre argues that 
men both make history and yet are made by it through the force of 
"scarcity." In other words, in our drive to freely create meaning in 
our lives we struggle against a shortage of things such as food, 
money, and time that we utilize in creating this meaning. Scarcity 
then defines the relationships we have with one another and the 
social structures that we construct. Sartre further claims that scar-
city cannot be eradicated but it can be overcome through coopera-
tion. In uniting myself with others (sharing scarce goods) we make 
it easier to achieve our desired ends. On the other hand, "this inti-
mate relation in its reality is the negation of unity.*1" That's to say, 
one realizes that the others who exist are the very reason that scar-
city exists and in working together to overcome scarcity one is 
only worsening the situation. Our condition can then be described 
as collaboration among rivals. Despite our quarrelsome predica-
ment, we march forward with life, freely creating individual val-
ues and meaning. In fact as a result of this situation, Sartre argues 
we perform concrete actions that seek to make our world a much 
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more bearable place to live. This constructive action is what Sar-
tre so famously describes as "praxis." Thus, Sartre has demon-
strated that instead of freedom being merely a given that humans 
choose to become aware of, it is now an activity of self-creation 
that we carry out in our situation of scarcity. He writes, "Freedom, 
here, does not mean possibility of choice, but the necessity of liv-
ing constraint, that is, of fulfilling a demand through a praxis." 1 8 
However, according to Sartre not only is our world constructed by 
our present actions and those of our forefathers, but by nature it-
self, which is completely inert and indifferent to our various 
projects. This world of what he now calls the Practico-Inert then 
creates antagonisms between man and nature and even more peril-
ously, between men themselves. According to Sartre, the collabo-
rative relationships that men construct soon then begin to develop 
on a somewhat larger scale forming a society and the social struc-
tures that accompany it. Social structures for Sartre can assume 
one of two types: a series or a group. "A series is a collection of 
people who are united only by external proximity. It does not exist 
as a whole 'inside' any of its members." 1 9 An example of a series 
would be something such as a bus line made up of various anxious 
people all realizing that although the seats are few, they will wait 
in line anyway so as to avoid fighting amongst themselves. On the 
other hand, a group "is a collection of people who, unlike those in 
a series, do have a common objective or end. Each member con-
verts his own individual Praxis into a common or social Praxis"20 
A group for Sartre truly is different from a series for in a group 
each of its members are required to vow their allegiance to the 
group's ideology and doctrine. To enforce this pledge terror and 
threats of violence are employed by authorities who are said to 
embody the group's beliefs. These violent tactics for Sartre are 
then the beginnings of an oppressive situation for any group. He 
writes, "Oppression can be realized only in the form of permanent 
violence, that is to say, in so far as it is practiced by an anti-human 
species whose freedom is essentially the freedom to do evil." 2 1 
Therefore, to put an end to these man-made evils a public revolu-
tion must occur with the aim of reorganizing our social structures 
(groups) and providing a solution to the problem of scarcity from 
which these groups emanate. However, Sartre reminds us that while 
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these very structures are sinister both in their makeup and pur-
pose, we can extract and utilize the one positive thing from them 
to ensure their destruction, i.e. cooperation. Sartre stresses the idea 
that as revolutionaries the only way to bring about positive change 
is if we work together in our cause. Thus, the very thing that once 
oppressed us now gives us the opportunity for our liberation. 
Two additional and rather short pieces that could be employed 
to refute Beauvoir's criticism are Portrait of The Anti-Semite and 
"Materialism and Revolution." In fact both of these Sartrean piec-
es were published fourteen years prior to the Critique thereby re-
futing the myth that Sartre's earlier works are abstract and disem-
bodied as Beauvoir claims of Being and Nothingness. 
In 1945 after having been a prisoner of war and witness to 
several atrocities, Sartre felt prompted to convey the hatred that 
made these atrocities possible in his book Portrait of The Anti-
Semite. He writes, "If a man attributes all or part of his country's 
and his misfortunes to the presence of Jewish elements, and if he 
proposes to remedy this state of affairs by depriving the Jews of 
certain of their rights, by debarring them from economic or social 
positions, by expelling them from the country, or by exterminat-
ing them wholesale, then that man is said to hold anti-Semitic opin-
ions." 2 2 According to Sartre, these opinions developed as a result 
of economic, political, and historical factors that have been used 
by anti-Semites to portray the Jewish people in a very negative 
light. He speaks of the 19 , h century Polish uprisings in which the 
Jews of Warsaw took an indifferent attitude towards the insur-
gents and have thus been deemed by many as traitors or cowards." 2 3 
A Jew then is defined as the embodiment of such reprehensible 
traits that could be interpreted as indicative of their past; or should 
one say rather a lack thereof. For Sartre argues that Jews "have no 
common homeland, and no history. The only tie which binds them 
together is the hostile contempt in which they are held by the com-
munities surrounding them." 2 4 However, he mentions that to be 
considered an authentic Jew "one must [freely] assert himself in 
and through the contempt shown towards him. [While] inauthen-
tic Jews are those whom other men regard as Jews, and who have 
chosen to flee from this unbearable situation." 2 5 This individual 
authenticity in which one asserts one's freedom to create and in-
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terpret one's own life then becomes a common cause for all Jews 
thereby signifying a collective authenticity. Unfortunately, he 
claims that many have chosen the path of inauthenticity and thus 
there is a "scarcity" of authentic Jews that are able to bring about 
positive change. Sartre further argues that "although the way to 
prove oneself authentic may well be to assert oneself as a Jew, 
[Jews] have failed to grasp the fact that authenticity is made man-
ifest through revolt." 2 6 According to Sartre, the only way in which 
Jewish authenticity is feasible is if they revolt against their evil 
society; for a social order that infringes upon an individual's free-
dom could never allow authenticity to become realized in the first 
place. Moreover, he stresses that in this battle against anti-Semit-
ism, the participation from "others" is crucial for he writes that 
"the cause of the Israelites would already be half won, if only their 
friends found in their defense a little of the passion and persever-
ance that their enemies devote to their destruction." 2 7 
It is well documented that Sartre was greatly influenced by 
Marxism and its call to end the exploitation of laborers. In his 
article "Materialism and Revolution" Sartre speaks of a different 
kind of revolution, namely a proletariat one. He argues here that a 
true revolutionary theory will show that "any collective order es-
tablished by men can be transcended toward other orders [which] 
are not yet clearly perceived since the society of which they are 
the expression does not yet exist—but which are invented by the 
very effort of the members of society to transcend it." 2 8 
However, the revolutionary cause initially seems just as futile 
as in the Jewish effort, if not more so. According to Sartre, the 
exploitation that laborers endure under the insatiable capitalists 
will go unnoticed by many due to the workers' repetitive yet min-
imal level of satisfaction and contentment. Furthermore, any op-
portunity to become aware of their oppressive situation is stifled 
by the constant vigilance and threatening tactics employed by their 
bourgeoisie employers. A worker is then more aware of his duties 
on the job than his rights, and in fact considers rights as things 
that are exterior to him and that belong to his superiors. As a re-
sult, Sartre contends that the first step towards liberation is to aban-
don the very idea that rights are possessed only by a select few; 
for workers are men and individuals just like the authorities that 
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exploit them. Their decision to revolt and their newly found rights 
and privileges that will eventually result from this decision, how-
ever, are not for Sartre as deterministic as envisioned by Marx. 
Granted both gentlemen would agree that revolution is the only 
path to liberation for "the only way the [the proletariat] can get 
what [they] want is by the destruction of the class that oppresses 
[them]." 2 9 However, the revolutionary solution for Sartre presup-
poses man's freedom to seize this solution. That's to say, the rights 
and revolutionary methods one employs to obtain these rights are 
simply what ever an individual makes them to be. Thus, as a result 
of the laborers' exploitative status and commitment to rebel against 
and alter their situation, they realize that mere thought or any no-
tion of an internal freedom would prove insufficient in achieving 
their goal. This is why Sartre writes, "Freedom is to be discovered 
only in the act, and is one with the act. It is not an inner virtue 
which permits us to detach ourselves from very pressing situa-
tions, because for man, there is no inside and no outside. But it is, 
on the contrary, the power to commit one's self in present action 
[to] change the present and to build a future." 3 0 
At this point and after having flushed out Sartre's ideas in 
more detail, it is only now that we can evaluate whether or not 
Sartre could possibly provide a plausible response to Beauvoir's 
criticism. This criticism once again is that which originates within 
Beauvoir's text The Ethics of Ambiguity and claims that Sartre's 
philosophy, more specifically his analysis of freedom, is a disem-
bodied one that fails to properly take into account the oppression/ 
injustice that many of us must endure and suffer through and, most 
importantly, one that lacks an ethics of action that demonstrates to 
the oppressed, oppressors, and to every "other" individual the ne-
cessity for such action that assumes the form of a social revolu-
tion. With the help of the aforementioned Sartrean works it would 
seem that one could easily construct an argument to refute each 
and every point that this criticism makes. First of all, it is apparent 
in works such as Portrait of the Anti-Semite and "Materialism and 
Revolution" that Sartre pays special attention to the oppressive 
situation of various groups and the threats of violence that are 
employed to keep them there. In regards to the plight of the Jews, 
Sartre reveals a level of deep sensitivity and contempt towards the 
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hatred that they receive simply because they are Jewish. And with 
respect to the proletarian cause, he is concerned about their cur-
rent yet elusive state of exploitation in which they are deprived of 
their own rights and privileges that they are to provide substance 
to like all other free individuals do. Second of all, it is also evident 
that Sartre has been able to move beyond his intuited notion of a 
personal freedom that many have labeled as being rather a static 
or inert freedom, which signals a collective involvement to act 
and revolt in efforts to constructively reorganize society and change 
its evil ways. This notion of constructive action is probably best 
identified with Sartre's notion of "praxis" in the Critique. In addi-
tion, let us not forget that in Portrait of the Anti-Semite, Sartre 
clearly emphasizes the point that freedom can only be discovered 
through action. Moreover, to claim that other people are inherent-
ly problematic for Sartre would seem to contradict the very ends 
that our actions are aimed to achieve. That is to say, Jews cannot 
free themselves from their anti-Semitic labels and workers could 
not throw down their chains of exploitation without the support of 
others. Thus, others are just as necessary in a revolution as the 
individual awareness and action that occur before others even come 
into play. 
Yet despite this somewhat reasonable reply, I feel that Sartre 
would still fall considerably short of possibly providing a proper 
and full response to Beauvoir's criticism. First, while he might 
recognize that oppression and injustices exist, he does not seem to 
portray them in the same repulsive manner that Beauvoir does that 
would seem necessary to warrant their eradication from society. 
In other words, in The Ethics of Ambiguity many of the social 
injustices that Beauvoir speaks of are things such as racism, sex-
ism, and any other prejudice or discriminatory tool arbitrarily con-
cocted by ignorant people to subjugate or objectify others. She 
explicitly argues that there are unjust distinctions made on the 
basis of skin color, sex, and wealth that divide the members of our 
society and that can longer be ignored. However, the Sartrean no-
tion of oppression, which initially is brought about by the force of 
scarcity, seems to reveal no such unjust distinctions of prejudice. 
In the Critique Sartre admits that scarcity, which eventually forc-
es people into oppressive groups, applies to all individuals and is 
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simply a universal fact of our human history. Moreover, this real-
ity of scarcity is not only the cause for our oppression but the 
source for our liberation. However, in a discussion contrasting the 
life of a child to that of a woman, Beauvoir completely denies the 
Sartrean idea of universal oppression and the possibility to liber-
ate oneself as result of one's oppression. Childhood is a "particu-
lar sort of situation: it is a natural situation whose limits are not 
created by other men and which is thereby not comparable to situ-
ation of oppression; it is a situation which is common to all men 
and which is temporary for all; therefore, it does not represent a 
limit which cuts off the individual from her possibilities, but, on 
the contrary, the moment of development in which new possibili-
ties are won," she writes. 3 1 While a woman's situation, on the oth-
er hand, is for Beauvoir a particularized state of oppression where 
she experiences a sexual prejudice from which no positive possi-
bilities or optimism could emanate. One could possibly refute this 
distinction by arguing that in Portrait of The Anti-Semite Sartre 
does speak of arbitrary distinctions of prejudice and hatred that do 
not apply to everyone but only to those who are considered a part 
of the Jewish population. While this point might seem somewhat 
plausible, this book describing the oppression of the Jews brings 
up another dilemma of Sartre's with regard to Beauvoir's notion 
of a moral freedom. That is to say, for Beauvoir as morally free 
beings we will or desire to fulfill our freedom and thus in the same 
regard desire to eradicate our oppression. And, on the contrary, 
just as easily as we can freely adopt our freedom we can at the 
same time reject it thereby becoming irresponsible and, moreover, 
inauthentic. Inauthenticity is a concept shared by Sartre but with-
in his analysis it seems much more of a looming problem than it 
would for his counterpart. In other words, Sartre has a tendency to 
ultimately ground or base his notion of oppression upon some fac-
tual source. In the Portrait he argues that anti-Semitism in part 
originates from "an impersonal and social phenomenon which can 
be expressed by figures and averages and which is conditioned by 
constant economic, historical, and political factors." 3 2 While these 
theories, including the one of scarcity, describing the origin of 
social oppression might prove to be accurate, Beauvoir has omit-
ted foundational explanations such as these. In fact I believe that 
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Beauvoir's reason for their omission was to not provide any story 
or allegory that could possibly sway the oppressed to merely ac-
cept their situation as part of the way things just are in the world. 
This method for Beauvoir would be just as dangerous "when a 
conservative wishes to show that the proletariat is not oppressed. 
He declares that the present distribution of wealth is a natural fact 
and that there is no means of rejecting it; and doubtless he has a 
good case for proving that [for] he is not stealing from the worker 
the product of his labor, since theft supposes social conventions 
which in other respects authorizes exploitation." 3 3 Moreover, not 
only do these theories deprive one of willing to achieve moral 
freedom, but of the personal desire to simply want to be with oth-
ers. In the Critique Sartre argues that scarcity forces us to have 
relationships with others and in the Portrait it is the anti-Semitic 
labels that brings the Jews together. However, nowhere in Sartre's 
analysis does he ever mention our desire to band together with our 
fellow man or the comradery that revolutionaries experience in 
overcoming their oppression. Thus, one could say about Sartre 
that our relationships with others are nothing more than a given or 
natural occurrence of our past just as his ontological notion of 
freedom is in Being and Nothingness. 
As a result of these aforementioned problems that arise within 
what many deem to be a possible Sartrean response, my conten-
tion is that Sartre is simply unable to provide a response that could 
truly refute Beauvoir's criticism. I attempted, however, to recount 
the arguments provided by many of Sartre's supporters that claim 
he does provide an ethical theory by examining both his later and 
earlier philosophical works; however, even with all this support I 
still believe that this argument is a futile one. Of course while I am 
well aware that the particular criticism by Beauvoir was in direct 
response to Sartre's Being and Nothingness, my essay tried to deal 
with the argument offered by many that this criticism applies to 
Sartre's philosophy as a whole. Unfortunately, I myself cannot 
make such a strong claim, for there are a plethora of Sartrean texts 
that I have not discussed, such as many of the literary and dramat-
ic works that he wrote throughout his life. These works convey 
several of Sartre's philosophical ideas of which I did not go into 
detail and thus I cannot dismiss. On the other hand, many Sartre-
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ans could argue that the texts that I have chosen to examine were 
not given the fair treatment that they deserve and that an ethical 
theory could be extracted from them. However, the trouble that I 
am experiencing is that even if such an ethical theory did exist 
within the parameters of these works, I just cannot identify it, i.e. 
it is not made accessible to the very philosophy student that is 
writing this paper. It would only seem logical that since most eth-
ical theories base their views upon concrete and recognizable be-
ings and the situations in which they live, that their accessibility 
to be understood should be regarded as recognizable as the views 
upon which it stands. 
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